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Antitrust as Disruptive Innovation in Health Care:
Can Limiting State Action Immunity Help Save a
Trillion Dollars?
William M. Sage & David A. Hyman*
On February 25, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled in North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC that state licensing
boards controlled by market participants are subject to federal antitrust
law unless they are “actively supervised” by the state itself. The ruling
may sound narrow and technical, but the significance of the case can be
inferred from the number and prominence of the amici curiae who lined
up to support the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners
(“North Carolina Board”)—first when the Federal Trade Commission’s
(“FTC”) internal enforcement action was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and again when that court’s
decision in favor of the FTC was reviewed by the Supreme Court.
This Article evaluates the potential of North Carolina State Board to
serve as a “disruptive innovation” that will make health care markets
more efficient. Over time, the Supreme Court’s holding might induce
states to reassess waste and inefficiency in professional services, rein in
self-regulatory privilege, and modify political settlements built atop the
scaffolding of professional self-governance that unduly constrain
markets, even when they do not explicitly violate federal antitrust law.
But, that will only happen if states embrace the opening that North
Carolina State Board offers to disrupt the status quo.
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INTRODUCTION: WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE . . .
On February 25, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled in North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC that state licensing
boards controlled by market participants are subject to federal antitrust
law unless they are “actively supervised” by the state itself.1 The ruling
may sound narrow and technical, but the significance of the case can be
inferred from the number and prominence of the amici curiae who lined
up to support the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners
(“North Carolina Board”)—first when the Federal Trade Commission’s
(“FTC”) internal enforcement action was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,2 and again when that court’s
decision in favor of the FTC was reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court.
1. 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
2. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2013).
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Before the Fourth Circuit, the North Carolina Board had the backing
of twenty-four “friends of the court”: twelve prestigious professional
organizations and twelve licensing boards or organizations of licensing
boards.3 When the case went before the Supreme Court, the North
Carolina Board’s amici were even more impressive—including twentyfour states and three state-level associations, eighteen licensing boards or
organizations of licensing boards, and seventeen professional
associations.4 When professional bodies this diverse and prominent go
to court to defend self-regulatory prerogatives that they have enjoyed for
many decades, they do not expect to lose.5 Yet the Supreme Court bluntly
3. The professional organizations were: American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, American
Academy of Periodontology, American Association of Dental Boards, American Association of
Orthodontists, American Dental Association, American Medical Association, American
Osteopathic Association, American Veterinary Medical Association, Medical Society of Virginia,
North Carolina Medical Society, South Carolina Medical Association, and West Virginia State
Medical Association. The licensing boards or organizations of licensing boards were: American
Association of Veterinary State Boards, Association of Social Work Boards, Federation of
Associations of Regulatory Boards, Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards, Federation of
State Boards of Physical Therapy, Federation of State Massage Therapy Boards, Federation of State
Medical Boards, International Conference of Funeral Service Examining Boards, Inc., National
Association of Boards of Pharmacy, National Association of Long Term Care Administrator
Boards, National Board for Certification in Occupational Therapy, and North Carolina Board of
Pharmacy. Brief of the American Dental Association, American Medical Association et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13534).
4. The list of states and state-level associations was: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Council of State Governments, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors
Association, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
and West Virginia. The list of licensing boards or organizations of licensing boards was: American
Association of Dental Boards, American Association of Veterinary State Boards, American
Association of State Counseling Boards, Association of Regulatory Boards of Optometry,
Association of Social Work Boards, Association of State and Provincial Psychology Boards,
Federation of State Boards of Physical Therapy, Federation of Associations of Regulatory Boards,
Federation of State Medical Boards, Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards, Federation of
State Massage Therapy Boards, International Conference of Funeral Service Examining Boards,
Inc., and National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying, National Council of State
Boards of Nursing, National Association of Long Term Care Administrator Boards, National
Association of Boards of Pharmacy, National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, and
North Carolina Board of Law Examiners. The list of professional organizations was: American
Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, American Association of Orthodontists, American Medical
Association, American Dental Association, American Osteopathic Association, American Society
of Anesthesiologists, American Veterinary Medical Association, California Optometric
Association, Florida State Bar, Medical Society of North Carolina, Medical Society of South
Carolina, Medical Society of Virginia, Medical Society of West Virginia, National Association of
State EMS Officials, Nevada State Bar, North Carolina State Bar, and West Virginia State Bar.
Brief for the State of West Virginia and 9 Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, N.C.
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534).
5. By comparison, the FTC had only one “friend” before the United States Court of Appeals for
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upheld the use of federal antitrust law to police anticompetitive conduct
by a state licensing board controlled by those it purported to regulate.
The fact that professional organizations lost—and lost so decisively—
marks a change in elite (and likely public) perceptions of the professions.
In the array of amici, the Supreme Court saw not a guardian force serving
the public interest, but a multi-headed hydra using a cloak of state
authority to devour its prey.
It helped that the Sherman Antitrust Act is no ordinary federal law.
Scholars label the Sherman Act a “super-statute” that reflects and
instantiates free enterprise as a fundamental value in American society. 6
When a law is regarded as a super-statute, it becomes:
one of the baselines against which other sources of law—sometimes
including the Constitution itself—are read. Ordinary rules of
construction are often suspended or modified when such statutes are
interpreted. Super-statutes tend to trump ordinary legislation when
there are clashes or inconsistencies, even when principles of
construction would suggest the opposite. Occasionally, super-statutes
can reshape constitutional understandings. Because super-statutes
exhibit this kind of normative gravity, they have sufficient attraction to
bend and reshape the surrounding landscape.7

Framed this way, the Court’s blunt rejection of the dentists’ claim of
professional privilege is less surprising.
Even so, two fundamental principles of federal jurisprudence dictated
the opposite result: respect for states as sovereign entities (i.e.,
federalism); and judicial deference to political actors, even those that may
have been captured by special interests. Had the Court been swayed by
these competing principles, it would have told the FTC (and federal
antitrust law) to butt out. Beginning with its 1943 decision in Parker v.
Brown, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress did not

the Fourth Circuit: the American Antitrust Institute. When the case made it to the Supreme Court,
the FTC had more “friends,” but they were drawn from less prestigious professional associations
(e.g., the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists, the American Association of Nurse
Practitioners, and the American College of Nurse Midwives); think tanks (e.g., the Cato Institute,
the Pacific Legal Foundation, and Public Citizen, Inc.); a few legal technology companies (e.g.,
LegalZoom.com, Fileright, JustAnswer, and Shake); and a gaggle of law professors. Brief for the
American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, N.C. State Bd. of Dental
Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534).
6. A super-statute is a law that “(1) establish[es] a new normative or institutional framework for
state policy and (2) over time does ‘stick’ in the public culture such that (3) the super-statute and
its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond
the four corners of the statute.” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001).
7. Id.
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intend the Sherman Act to override state regulation.8 If North Carolina
dentists were using state licensing authority to screw up the market for
dental services, Parker and subsequent decisions indicated that problem
was none of the federal government’s business—and the sovereign state
of North Carolina should be left to sort things out, or not, as it saw fit.
That said, the facts were not on the dental profession’s side. Practicing
dentists who controlled the North Carolina Board had sent cease-anddesist letters to small teeth-whitening businesses and the shopping malls
that housed them—and these letters threatened criminal prosecution for
the unlicensed practice of dentistry.9 Because the North Carolina Board
lacked specific statutory authorization from the state legislature both to
define the alleged legal violation and to level the accusation in the form
taken, the FTC brought an enforcement action to reverse what it
considered overtly anticompetitive conduct not protected by “state
action” immunity. The fact that so many professional boards and
associations lined up behind the North Carolina dentists in a case with
bad facts and bad law speaks volumes about the self-interested
parochialism of the professions.
A truism of litigation is that when both the facts and the law are against
you, pound the table and argue public policy. To the North Carolina
Board’s amici, compelling considerations of expertise, ethics, and public
safety combined to add “professional sovereignty” to the balance as a
third fundamental principle—and, in their view, tipped the scales of
justice conclusively in favor of the North Carolina Board. Yet the Court
resolved the conflict between a free enterprise super-statute and three
established doctrines arguing for judicial restraint with a clear
smackdown of professional monopoly. Moreover, by condemning a state
licensing body, the Court shook the foundation of self-regulatory
authority that politically powerful professions have used to rig the rules
of the service delivery game in their favor.
The Supreme Court likely regarded the dentists’ conduct, however
reprehensible, more as hubris than as inefficiency. Allowing nondentists
to offer cheap, safe tooth whitening will not make dentistry as a whole
cheaper or safer. Still, the Court would not have reached its conclusion
8. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363 (1943).
9. Teeth whitening in North Carolina was available from dentists, either as an in-office service
or in a take-home form; as an over-the-counter product; and from nondentists in salons, shopping
malls, and other locations. The version provided by dentists was more powerful and required fewer
treatments, but was significantly more expensive and less convenient. In response to complaints
by dentists that nondentists were providing lower-cost teeth-whitening services, the North Carolina
Board sent dozens of stern letters threatening official action. There were no complaints by
consumers about the quality of teeth-whitening services that they were receiving—let alone
evidence of consumer harm. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1108.
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had it kept to the conventional wisdom that markets for learned
professions such as dentistry, medicine, and law work better when
external influences on their collective decisions are minimized. And once
one begins to see the affordability of high-quality professional services
as an intrinsic rather than an external challenge, the use of antitrust law
to constrain self-interest, reduce waste, and enhance consumer choice
becomes much more attractive. This is particularly true for our health
care system, which wastes approximately $1 trillion every year on
overpriced, unnecessary, and ineffective services.10
Antitrust law is frequently and properly charged with policing
combinations of large corporations that threaten to harm consumers
through monopoly or oligopoly pricing. Although consolidation of this
sort is an increasing problem in health care—particularly in the hospital,
health insurance, and pharmaceutical sectors—anticompetitive risks have
arisen more frequently from coordinated behavior among independent
physicians practicing in local markets for health care services. Antitrust
authorities have worked for decades to combat these restraints of trade,
but the North Carolina State Board decision goes to the heart of the issue
by confronting professional self-protection under color of state law.
This Article evaluates the potential of the North Carolina State Board
decision to serve as a “disruptive innovation” that can make health care
markets more efficient. Over time, the Supreme Court’s holding might
induce states to reassess waste and inefficiency in professional services,
rein in self-regulatory privilege, and modify political settlements built
atop the scaffolding of professional self-governance that unduly constrain
markets, even when they do not explicitly violate federal antitrust law.
Part II explains the deep legal architecture that is a root cause of flawed
competition in United States health care and identifies ways in which
state licensing boards contribute to the problem. Part III explores the
impact to date of North Carolina State Board. Part IV sketches paths of
greater or lesser health care innovation that might follow North Carolina
State Board and concludes with some general observations on the
challenges associated with the federal government’s concurrent
responsibilities as health care payor, regulator, and antitrust enforcer.
I. THE $1 TRILLION LEGAL PROBLEM OF FLAWED COMPETITION IN
HEALTH CARE
Health care in the United States faces a crisis of quality and value.
10. Nikhil Sahni et al., How the U.S. Can Reduce Waste in Health Care Spending by $1 Trillion,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/10/how-the-u-s-can-reduce-waste-inhealth-care-spending-by-1-trillion.
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With expenditures of $3.2 trillion annually, the United States health care
system is by far the world’s most costly but is certainly not the best in
terms of quality. Health care services are poorly accessible, fragmented,
and unreliable. Preventive care is neglected. Adherence even to wellestablished clinical “best practices” is uncommon. Medical errors are
frequent. Patients’ goals and concerns go unmet. Social problems are
frequently medicalized but seldom addressed. Moreover, by several
estimates, approximately $1 trillion is wasted each year for care that is
nearly always overpriced, frequently useless, sometimes harmful, and,
often fraudulent.
A. From “Iron Triangle” to “Triple Aim”
Until recently, medically miraculous but expensive technology was
considered the principal driver of health care costs. But now, services
that are overpriced, inefficiently produced, and ineffectively delivered are
recognized as the engines of overspending. This reframing has profound
implications for domestic health policy.
In a book titled Medicine’s Dilemmas: Infinite Needs Versus Finite
Resources, academic physician William Kissick asserted: “No society
can provide all the services its population is able to utilize.”11 In
economic terms, Kissick’s formulation placed health care expenditures
on a Pareto frontier, making “guns or butter” tradeoffs necessary. Kissick
therefore conceived of access to care, its quality, and its cost as
constituting what political scientists call an “Iron Triangle”: public
policies improving performance on one or two of the objectives would
necessarily worsen performance on the remaining objectives.12 For these
reasons, deliberate rationing would become necessary to constrain health
care spending.
But what if health care was just massively inefficient? Research at
Dartmouth documented unjustified variation in clinical practices and
associated costs.13 Other studies demonstrated systematic problems with

11. WILLIAM KISSICK, MEDICINE’S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE RESOURCES
48 (1994).
12. Id. at 2–3.
13. These substantial, unexpected geographic variations in medical treatment were not
associated with either greater health care needs or superior clinical outcomes. Understanding of
the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Health Care System, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE
(2015), http://www.dartmouthatlas.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). It became clear that “best
practices” were seldom available, outcomes of care were typically unmeasurable, and clear
advances in medical knowledge often took years to diffuse into communities and alter the habits of
local physicians.
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quality and safety.14 There was renewed interest in population health and
attention to “social determinants” of health. Payment models based on
private sector management gained popularity. Although the “managed
care” revolution of the 1990s proved to be cumbersome and unpopular,
the Iron Triangle concept of national health policy slowly gave way to an
alternative vision: the “Triple Aim.”
The “Triple Aim,” which was the brainchild of Harvard pediatrician
Donald Berwick and his Institute for Healthcare Improvement, consists
of simultaneously improving the patient experience of care (including
quality and satisfaction), improving the health of populations, and
reducing the per capita cost of health care.15 The “Triple Aim” therefore
integrates individual and population health, takes the existing health care
system off the Pareto frontier, and makes the “value” of health care (both
its productive and its allocative efficiency) the central inquiry. Moreover,
instead of waiting for a definitive political solution, the “Triple Aim”
emphasizes the importance of decentralized incremental improvements.
B. Waste, Law, and the Medical Profession
Although a variety of imperfections in information and incentives
diminish the value proposition of the current health care system, the
principal source of wastefulness is the American medical profession,
which not only enjoys substantial self-regulatory privileges but also
receives generous public subsidies for its work.16
Although
14. Many beneficial treatments are underused, while other expensive, risky therapies are
overused. Misuse is also common, resulting in medical errors. Mark R. Chassin, Robert W. Galvin
& the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality, The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care
Quality: Institute of Medicine National Roundtable on Health Care Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1000
(1998). Similar evidence accumulated regarding iatrogenic (physician-induced) injury; based on
this evidence, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) estimated in 1999 that medical errors kill 44,000–
98,000 hospitalized patients annually. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn ed., 1st ed. 2000). A recent meta-analysis in the Journal of
Patient Safety concluded that “preventable harm to patients” causes more than 400,000 premature
deaths each year, making medical error the third leading cause of death in the United States. John
T. James, A New, Evidence-Based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with Hospital Care, 9 J.
PATIENT SAFETY 122, 125 (2013).
15. IHI Triple Aim Initiative, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT (2015),
http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
Berwick served for just over a year as director of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
pursuant to a recess appointment.
16. The IOM has attributed over $750 billion each year to waste. INST. FOR MED., BEST CARE
AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 38 (Mark
Smith et al. eds., 2012). Of this amount, an estimated $210 billion reflects unnecessary services,
including overuse not justified by scientific evidence, discretionary use beyond established
benchmarks, and unnecessary choice of higher-cost services. Id. at 102. The IOM identified
another $130 billion in inefficiently delivered services, including medical errors, preventable
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approximately two-thirds of health care spending is controlled by
physicians, a relatively small percentage is retained by them personally.
Most of the money is directed elsewhere (i.e., to hospital care, post-acute
services, diagnostic testing, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and
consultations from other professionals). It is for this reason that the most
expensive piece of equipment in a modern hospital is often said to be the
physician’s pen (or, these days, keyboard).
Physicians possess this power for a simple reason: the body of
doctrines and practices that we call “health law” systematically supports
it. Laws protect the public from individuals and therapies not controlled
by physicians, and discourage medical self-help. Laws fund physicians’
tools and assure their quality—though unfortunately not their value.
Laws mandate and subsidize insurance coverage for the treatments
physicians recommend. Laws insulate physicians from corporate
structures and contractual norms. Laws mediate disputes between
physicians and patients based on professional standards. Laws apply
medical criteria to most ethical issues. Finally, laws such as those
challenged in North Carolina State Board delegate substantial rule
making and disciplinary authority to state licensing boards (i.e., to entities
populated from, and controlled by, the medical profession). States
typically justify this abdication of direct oversight in terms of physicians’
scientific expertise, and their ethical duty to heal, not harm, patients.
Both individually and collectively, these laws profoundly distort
competition in health care and severely hamper the market’s ability to
generate the benefits of competition that we see in other industries.
Production remains fragmented. Prices are both inflated and arbitrary—
and price competition is minimal (when it even exists at all). There are
many barriers to competitive entry—even to deliver the most basic
services. Geographic markets are needlessly small and are surprisingly
concentrated. Supply bottlenecks are common, often to the mutual
benefit of large health insurers and dominant health care providers. And
innovation is limited to the sorts of inputs that fit into existing production
processes—mainly drugs, diagnostics, and medical devices.
The result is that our health care system almost never trades in the types
of consumer products that dominate other costly, complex,
complications, fragmented care, unnecessary use of higher-cost providers, and operational
inefficiency at care delivery sites. Id. Excess administrative costs accounted for $190 billion,
missed prevention opportunities for $55 billion, and fraud for $75 billion. Id. The IOM’s final
category, amounting to $105 billion in annual waste, is “Prices That Are Too High”—meaning that
they exceed competitive benchmarks. Id. Considerable research has suggested that high and
arbitrary prices rather than excessive utilization of care are primarily responsible for the United
States’ aberrantly large medical expenditures compared to other countries.
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technologically sophisticated industries. Instead of fully assembled
products accompanied by a strong performance warranty, patients are
expected to pay for disaggregated professional process steps (including
procedures and consultations) to which billing codes have been assigned,
and for equally atomized inputs and complements to those professional
processes (such as diagnostic tests and surgical supplies). Health
insurance agglomerates these unstructured procedural steps and physical
inputs into “covered benefits,” but it does not assemble them into actual,
useful products—and only a few true Health Maintenance Organizations
(“HMOs”) provide comprehensive prepaid care.
The past decade has witnessed growing agreement regarding both the
necessary attributes of a high-performing health care system,17 and the
managerial strategies for achieving them.18 Much less attention has been
paid to the legal obstacles that have long hindered attempts to redesign
acute and complex care—let alone to moving the locus of basic care
“upstream,” where it can be communally or self-administered, rather than
professionally controlled. As currently constituted, American health law
presents concrete structural impediments to accomplishing these
consensus health policy goals, and also creates opportunities for
incumbent providers to delay or sabotage such efforts.
C. Anticompetitive Effects of Medical Licensing
The deep legal architecture of health care strongly favors physician
self-regulation, and furthers physicians’ professional insularity and selfinterest. Physician-controlled medical licensing boards have attracted
17. In a book-length report, the IOM succinctly stated the six core characteristics of a highperforming health care system: (i) “safe: avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended
to help them”; (ii) “effective: providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who could
benefit and refraining from providing services to those not likely to benefit”; (iii) “patient-centered:
providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and
values, and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions”; (iv) “timely: reducing waits
and sometimes harmful delays for both those who receive and those who give care”; (v) “efficient:
avoiding waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, ideas, and energy”; and (vi) “equitable:
providing care that does not vary in quality because of personal characteristics such as gender,
ethnicity, geographic location, and socioeconomic status.” INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY
CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 39–40 (2001).
18. As two leading experts in health care management state: “There is no longer any doubt about
how to increase the value of care.” Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will
Fix Health Care, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/the-strategy-that-will-fixhealth-care. The standard toolkit for pursuing value includes measuring costs and outcomes,
expecting payment only for successful care, building “integrated practice units,” and embracing
health information technology. Successfully launching these innovations depends critically on
effective competition in the marketplace. MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH O. TEISBERG,
REDEFINING HEALTH CARE: CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS 172 (2006).
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criticism for decades. Milton Friedman famously wrote in 1962:
I am . . . persuaded that [restrictive] licensure has reduced both the
quantity and quality of medical practice; . . . that it has forced the public
to pay more for less satisfactory medical service[;] and that it has
retarded technological development both in medicine itself and in the
organization of medical practice.19

At the time he made it, Friedman’s harsh economic critique of
occupational licensing was not widely shared (except among other
libertarians). Professional elites were thought to represent a progressive,
prosperous alternative to industrial commodification and the supposed
exploitation of labor. To be sure, there was some recognition that the
professions might use ethical codes to pursue their own economic selfinterest.20 But mainstream economists such as Kenneth Arrow still
believed that collective professionalism improved the marketability of
health care by fostering the trust needed to overcome medical uncertainty
and informational asymmetry between physicians and patients.21 More
recently, a wide array of voices have questioned the economics, and even
the justice, of professional privilege.22
In 2015, the Obama
Administration issued a report on occupational licensing, finding that
“licensing can . . . reduce employment opportunities and lower wages for
excluded workers, and increase costs for consumers,” and that “the costs
of licensing fall disproportionately on certain populations.”23
19. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 149–59 (1962).
20. Compare Talcott Parsons, Professions, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 536, 545 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (noting that professions have “become the
most important single component in the structure of modern societies”), with ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE (1970)
(arguing that the medical profession has become too powerful and too autonomous).
21. Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941, 965 (1963).
22. Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (2014); Alexander Volokh, The New Private
Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 931, 933 (2014).
23. THE WHITE HOUSE, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS
(July
2015),
https://search.archives.gov/search?query=Occupational+Licensing%3A+A+Framework+for+Poli
cymakers+&op=Search&affiliate=obamawhitehouse (follow “Occupational Licensing: A
Framework for Policymakers” hyperlink). The report’s executive summary notes that: (i) “by
imposing additional requirements on people seeking to enter licensed professions, licensing can
reduce total employment in the licensed professions”; (ii) “unlicensed workers earn 10 to 15 percent
lower wages than licensed workers with similar levels of education, training, and experience”; (iii)
licensing laws lead to higher prices for goods and services, with research showing effects on prices
of between 3 and 16 percent . . . . [but often] did not increase the quality of goods and services”;
(iv) about 35 percent of military spouses in the labor force work in professions that require State
licenses or certification, and . . . . may have difficulty acquiring a new license each time they move”;
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To be sure, medical licensing laws are not solely to blame for health
care’s competitive shortcomings. Other federal and state regulations and
subsidies bear responsibility as well. Still, licensing boards set the tone
for the rest of health law as gatekeepers into the health professions and
arbiters of practice once admitted. These boards determine the permitted
scope of practice, confer authority to write prescriptions, police
departures from conventional patterns of care, respond to complaints by
licensees about outsiders, and decide when (and, usually, when not) to
take disciplinary action against a licensed professional.
From a health policy perspective, physician-imposed barriers to
market entry and innovation—typically enforced by a professional
licensing board—are the most pernicious practice. Licensing boards set
standards for acceptability and impose discipline on licensees who violate
their dictates. Unlicensed practice is a criminal act. These entry barriers
not only deter novel approaches from new directions, such as telehealth
and various “upstream” self-care modalities, but they also discourage
existing competitors from adopting practices introduced to the market by
disruptive innovators.
Medical licensing boards also reinforce norms of physician primacy
that limit the ability of other licensed health professionals to enter the
market, even when they have extensive training in diagnosis and
treatment. For example, the scientific case for expanding nursing practice
is well established, but Texas and a few other states still deny advanced
practice nurses the ability to practice independently. 24 If these barriers to
entry are directly imposed by politically accountable state legislatures,
then they are immune from federal antitrust scrutiny. But when
physicians use medical licensing boards to impose similar restraints, the
antitrust laws can help push back—particularly given the resulting loss
of competition, innovation, and economic opportunity for advanced
practice nurses.25
II. NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
There have been only limited changes since Friedman’s scathing
criticism in 1962 of medical licensing boards. Reforms have typically
added a few lay or nonphysician members to licensing boards and
and (iv) “licensing requirements often make it difficult for immigrants to work in fields where they
have valuable experience and training.” Id. at 4–5.
24. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH 22–23
(Oct. 5, 2011); Implementation Status Map, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. BOARDS NURSING,
https://www.ncsbn.org/5397.htm (last updated Aug. 22, 2016).
25. Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman, Antitrust and the Future of Nursing: Federal Competition
Policy and the Scope of Practice, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 149–50 (2014).
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increased transparency regarding disciplinary actions against licensees.
These changes may have made licensing boards more open to new
modalities of care that extend physician capacity, but they are still likely
to obstruct the development of products and services that promote selfcare without the need for physician consultation or control. Aggressively
applied, the North Carolina State Board standard can deter such
anticompetitive conduct, thereby facilitating market entry and broader
innovations in care delivery.
A. State Action and Professional Regulation
If private parties conspire with one another to restrain competition, they
may face civil and criminal sanctions for violating antitrust law. But, as
noted above, courts have inferred congressional intent to let state laws
stand that depart from competitive norms—and Congress has never
declared that inference incorrect.26 Consistent with fundamental
conceptions of federalism, states may enact legislation that flatly
contravenes federal antitrust law and may even shelter private actors from
antitrust challenge, so long as the state satisfies two conditions. 27 The
state must clearly articulate its purpose to substitute a less competitive
regime,28 and the state must actively supervise private parties whose
conduct would otherwise be unlawfully anticompetitive.29
Over the years, health care providers have taken generous advantage
of this invitation to obtain state authorization of anticompetitive conduct.
Often, providers’ interest in reducing competition aligned with more
general concerns about cost or quality, resulting in all-payer rate
regulation, certificate-of-need requirements for capital investment,
nonphysician scope of practice restrictions, and similar measures. In the
1990s, physicians in several states sought antitrust exemptions so they
could bargain collectively with HMOs over fees, but were unsuccessful
at securing such a blanket privilege to cartelize. More recently, hospital
systems in some regions have negotiated Certificates of Public
Advantage (“COPAs”) with state governments, allowing them to act as
(lightly) regulated monopolies. In most of these situations, the federal
26. See supra text accompanying note 8 (noting how since its decision in Parker v. Brown, the
Supreme Court has found that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to override state
regulation).
27. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 99, 105 (1980).
28. A municipality or other nonsovereign political subdivision or public actor may adopt
anticompetitive laws or ordinances without active supervision by the state, but the state must still
clearly articulate the authority it has conferred. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct.
1003, 1006 (2013).
29. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015).
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antitrust enforcement agencies have been powerless to do more than
register their objections publicly, often through correspondence with state
legislative and executive branch leadership under the FTC’s program of
“competition advocacy.” Going forward, however, the combination of
North Carolina State Board with the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.30 may reinvigorate federal
antitrust challenges to hospitals’ assertions of self-regulatory privilege.
Many questions nonetheless remain about the permissibility of specific
state medical board practices post-North Carolina State Board. The
tradition of collective self-governance among the professions gives rise
to a variety of organized entities that enroll members, adopt policies,
articulate standards, and engage the public. Some are indisputably
private, voluntary associations, while others play quasi-public roles as
certifiers of quality and fitness, and still others—such as licensing
boards—are designated as state agencies.
The Supreme Court has long finessed the issue of whether legislatively
chartered self-regulatory entities, such as licensing boards, are
definitively public bodies. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, for
example, the Supreme Court noted only that the State Bar was a state
agency in Virginia for some “limited purposes.”31 In Goldfarb, however,
the State Bar’s role in restraining competition was indirect. An
unquestionably private county bar association published a fee schedule
for its members that listed prices for title review services, but that
schedule was binding only because the State Bar issued ethical opinions
declaring compliance with county bar schedules to be a professional
obligation. Importantly, the state judiciary never reviewed these ethical
opinions, so there was no possibility of active supervision.
In North Carolina, by contrast, the state dental board directly imposed
the restraint of trade. Six of the eight spots on the North Carolina Board
were required to be held by North Carolina licensed dentists, who were
elected by their peers to serve. In denying state action immunity, the
Court emphasized that the North Carolina Board was composed of a
majority of practicing members of the profession it regulated.32 As a
result, the Court applied active supervision requirements to an
administrative body of a sovereign state that it would not have applied to
30. 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1017 (2013) (rejecting a state action defense in a proposed merger to
monopoly involving a public hospital system that had been given general corporate powers by the
State of Georgia).
31. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (“The fact that the State Bar is a state
agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster
anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.”).
32. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
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a nonsovereign municipality.
But the Court did not specify the exact meaning of “active supervision”
for a licensing board, nor did it definitively resolve the dental board’s
legal status as public or private. This makes it difficult to know if the
Court’s condemnation of anticompetitive board conduct will have a
lasting effect on self-regulatory practices at the state level, or whether the
ruling’s potentially sweeping implications for nonconflicted public
oversight of professions will be evaded through a combination of politicsas-usual in statehouses and collateral attacks in court.
B. Litigation After North Carolina State Board
Litigation citing North Carolina State Board is already underway—
involving both state licensing boards and other state agencies whose
decisions affect professionals. The current status of more than a dozen
cases, involving a wide array of licensed professionals, is summarized
below – broken out by area of specialty.
1. Medicine
Teladoc, a Dallas-based company that contracts with licensed Texas
physicians to provide telephonic consultations to patients within the state,
filed a high-profile private antitrust lawsuit against the Texas Medical
Board (“TMB”).33 Teladoc physicians sometimes prescribe medications
during telephonic sessions, a practice that the TMB attempted to
eliminate over the last several years using an increasingly stringent set of
interpretations and amendments to its longstanding Rule 190.8, which
prohibits prescriptions unless a physician-patient relationship is clearly
established.34 According to the TMB, that relationship can only be
established by an in-person physical examination performed by the
physician, or by presentation of the patient to the physician by another
health professional using a high-resolution video connection.35
After North Carolina State Board was decided, Teladoc filed an
antitrust complaint, claiming that the TMB’s prohibition on prescribing
after telephonic consultation enhances the market power of Texaslicensed physicians. Teladoc is a corporation, not an individual licensee,
and its innovative system of telephonic consultation is less personal, but
significantly cheaper, than conventional face-to-face medical care.
33. Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 533 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
34. Id. at 533–34 (referencing 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8 (2017)).
35. The Texas Medical Board (“TMB”) initially sought to achieve its goals by enacting an
“emergency rule” in January 2015. Id. at 534. That rule was stayed by the courts for lack of a
demonstrated emergency. Id. TMB subsequently amended the rule in May 2015 to explicitly
require an in-person consultation. Id.
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Complaints about Teladoc were brought to the medical board by
physicians who were Teladoc’s actual or potential competitors. None of
Teladoc’s customers complained about their services. Like many states,
the Texas legislature had explicitly addressed telephonic prescription in
connection with Medicaid’s coverage of telemedicine, but it had left
judgments regarding what constitutes ethical practice of the profession
outside the coverage context to the state’s medical board. The TMB’s
decision to expand the scope of Rule 190.8 was based largely on the board
members’ personal experiences and beliefs regarding appropriate
medical care, and not on empirical evidence of risk or harm to patients.
Because twelve of the TMB’s nineteen members were licensed
physicians, the dispute fit squarely within the North Carolina State Board
holding. A federal district court granted Teladoc a preliminary injunction
temporarily restraining enforcement of the new rule.36
TMB
subsequently sought to have the case dismissed, arguing that its rulemaking processes are actively supervised because its decisions are
subject to judicial review by Texas courts, the State Office of
Administrative Hearings, and the Texas legislature. The district court
denied immunity, and TMB sought immediate appellate review under the
collateral order doctrine.37 Unlike North Carolina State Board, however,
the majority of amicus briefs filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit supported Teladoc, including a brief from the FTC
and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).38 Perhaps for this reason, TMB
voluntarily withdrew its appeal on October 17, 2016, returning the case
to the district court for trial. Given this uncertainty, the Texas telehealth
industry negotiated a compromise bill, including new standards for
teleprescribing. The bill, which was recently enacted by the Texas
legislature, and is awaiting the signature of the governor, is likely to
36. Teladoc also argued that TMB’s new policies violated the Commerce Clause. Id.
37. Id. at 535. Warning: the remainder of this footnote is for civil procedure junkies. While the
case was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the American
Antitrust Institute filed an amicus brief arguing that the lower court’s decision was not appealable
as a collateral order. Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 1-15-CV-343-RP, 2015 WL 8773509 (W.D.
Tex. Dec. 14, 2015) (No. 16-50017). In response, TMB returned to the district court, and sought
to have the order certified for appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)—six months and twentytwo days after the original order denying state action immunity was issued. Teladoc, Inc., 1:15CV-343-RP, 2016 WL 4362208 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2016). The district court held that the request
for certification was untimely. Id. at *1.
38. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 16-50017 (5th Cir. June 27,
2016) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit first lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal and second, that even
if that court has jurisdiction, the court should affirm the district court's order and reject the Board’s
argument that its rules are shielded from federal antitrust scrutiny by the “state action” doctrine).
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render the litigation moot.39
In Baker County Medical Services, Inc. v. Florida, a hospital sued
Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) and a
competing corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment that a certificate
of need issued to the competing corporation was expired.40 The Florida
circuit court dismissed the complaint, but the First District Court of
Appeal of Florida held that the AHCA had exceeded its statutory
authority in approving a settlement agreement that extended the
certificate of need. The court cited to North Carolina State Board for the
proposition that “when a State empowers a group of active market
participants to decide who can participate in its market, and on what
terms, the need for supervision is manifest.”41
In Axcess Medical Clinic, Inc., v. Easterling, a pain management clinic
sued three members of the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure
for shutting down the clinic for several months on the grounds that the
physician-owner was “practicing pain management without the proper
qualifications.”42 The complaint alleged that the state board created
“special education and certification requirements for a ‘pain management
medical practice’ as arbitrarily defined by the board.”43 The court
granted partial summary judgment with respect to due process and
reputational injury in September 2015,44 but no decision or settlement
was reached on the antitrust claim.
Other cases have found sufficient supervision. In Prime Healthcare
Services-Monroe, LLC v. Indiana University Health Bloomington, Inc.,
Monroe Hospital accused Indiana University Health Bloomington of
“unlawfully abusing and leveraging a municipally-granted monopoly in
the provision of emergency medical transportation services in Monroe
County.”45 Among other things, the defendant argued that it was immune
from liability under the state action doctrine. The district court agreed,
holding that under the second prong of the North Carolina State Board
test, Indiana “actively supervises” IU Ambulance’s delivery of patients
39. See
Bill:
SB
1107,
TEX.
LEGISLATURE
ONLINE,
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=85R&Bill=SB1107 (last visited
May 18, 2017) (showing bill passed the Texas Senate on March 30, 2017, and the Texas House on
May 12, 2017).
40. 178 So. 3d 71, 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
41. Id. at 77 (citing N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015)).
42. No. 3:14CV112 DPJ-FKB, 2015 WL 5642975, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 24, 2015).
43. Complaint, Axcess Med. Clinic v. Miss. State Bd. of Med. Licensure, No. 3:14CV112 DPJFKB, 2015 WL 5642975 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 24, 2015) (3:15cv307WHB-JCG).
44. Axcess Med. Clinic, 2015 WL 5642975, at *8.
45. No. 1:16-cv-00003-RLY-DKL, 2016 WL 6818956, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016).
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because through
its statutory scheme and . . . the enactment of the EMS Commission,
[the state] . . . has developed comprehensive oversight of emergency
medical services to protect consumer welfare. Therefore, permitting
this lawsuit to go forward circumvents the process in favor of a federal
forum. This is the very scenario the state-action doctrine was intended
to prevent.46

In Murphy-Dubay v. Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs,
the plaintiff completed medical school in the Antilles but could not gain
acceptance to a residency program in the United States.47 He submitted
an application on a form he created himself, seeking a “limited license”
to practice medicine within the state of Michigan. He received a letter
from the Michigan Board of Medicine stating that the board does not
issue limited licenses to individuals upon request, and that these licenses
are not for “someone whose education or training does not meet the
requirements of licensure as a physician.”48 The plaintiff filed an appeal
seeking judicial review, and the Michigan Court of Appeals found that
the policy complained of was “exempt from federal antitrust laws under
the ‘state action’ doctrine because it is clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy and the policy is actively
supervised by the state,” citing North Carolina State Board.49
2. Nursing
In Rodgers v. Louisiana Board of Nursing, a nursing student claimed
that the State of Louisiana Board of Nursing violated the Federal
Sherman and Clayton Acts, by “restraining trade and commerce with
respect to nursing education because the Board singularly relied upon an
eighty percent passage rate to terminate” the plaintiff’s nursing
program.50 The district court granted the nursing board’s motion to
dismiss the complaint, finding that it had no subject matter jurisdiction
because the board was entitled to sovereign immunity.51 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit declined to import the second prong of the Board of Dental
Examiners test from Parker v. Brown immunity to sovereign immunity.52

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
2015).
52.

Id. at *8.
876 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 601.
Id. at 607.
665 F. App’x 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2016).
Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, No. 15-615-JJB-SCR, 2015 WL 9274930 (M.D. La. Dec. 18
Rodgers, 665 F. App’x at 330; see supra text accompanying note 8 (discussing Parker).
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3. Chiropractors
In Rivera-Nazario v. Corporacion del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, a
group of licensed chiropractors sued a public corporation created by the
Puerto Rican legislature for the purpose of carrying out the Compensation
System for Work-Related Accidents Act.53 The chiropractors claimed
the public corporation was violating the Sherman Act by excluding
chiropractors from the workers compensation system. The court held that
the corporation was exempt from complying with the active supervision
requirement because it was a public subdivision of the State, with a public
mission, and its board members were appointed by the Governor of
Puerto Rico.54 The court concluded that the corporation did “not pose
the risk that market participants will use [it] to pursue private interest that
the Court was concerned with in [North Carolina State Board].”55
In Petrie v. Virginia Board of Medicine, a chiropractor sued the
Virginia Board of Medicine for allegedly engaging in a conspiracy to
exclude chiropractors from certain markets for medical services in
violation of the Sherman Act.56 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding that the chiropractor
failed to prove that the board’s actions constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade.57 The court cited North Carolina State Board for the
proposition that state government policy judgments are generally
immune from attack under federal antitrust law.58
4. Acupuncture
In Henry v. North Carolina Acupuncture Licensing Board, licensed
physical therapists and their patients brought antitrust claims in federal
court against the North Carolina Acupuncture Licensing Board after
receiving cease-and-desist orders for providing “dry needling.”59 The
litigation was the continuation of a long-running dispute between
physical therapists and acupuncturists over whether physical therapists
were engaged in the practice of acupuncture by performing dry needling.
The state attorney general had previously sided with the physical
therapists, and a separate lawsuit filed by the acupuncture board against
the state board of physical therapy examiners was dismissed on
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

No. 14-1533 (JAG), 2015 WL 9484490, at *1 (D.P.R. 2015).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *7.
648 F. App’x 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 356.
No. 1:15-cv-00831, 2017 WL 401234, at *1 (M.D.N.C. 2015).
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jurisdictional grounds. The antitrust suit is still pending.60
5. Veterinarians
In Robb v. Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine, a veterinarian
brought an antitrust action against the Connecticut Board of Veterinary
Medicine, claiming that the board conspired to restrain trade through an
agreement to remove from the Connecticut market for veterinary services
any veterinarian who offered certain reduced dosages of the rabies
vaccine to patient-animals.61 The district court found that the board,
similar to the North Carolina Board, was “comprised of a majority of
private practitioners” and was thus “capable of illegal concerted
action.”62 But the court reasoned that the “capacity to conspire does not
mean that every action taken by the Board satisfies [section 1 of the
Sherman Act's] contract, combination, or conspiracy requirement” and
subsequently found that the plaintiff failed to plead “a single factual
allegation affirmatively evincing the existence of an agreement amongst
the Defendants.”63
6. Dentists
In Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, a teeth-whitening service
provider brought an action against the Commissioner of the Connecticut
Department of Public Health, seeking relief against enforcement of a
regulation that only allowed licensed dentists to use a light-emitting diode
lamp to whiten teeth.64 The district court held that a rational basis existed
for the alleged discriminatory regulation.65 In response to the plaintiff’s
argument that the purpose of the restriction was to protect the monopoly
on dental services enjoyed by licensed dentists, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted (citing North Carolina State
Board) that “[t]his raises a question of growing importance and also
permits us to emphasize that we do not decide . . . whether the regulation
is valid under the antitrust laws.”66

60. See Eric Kroh, Acupuncture Antitrust Suit Goes Forward in North Carolina, LAW360 (Jan.
31, 2017, 3:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/886552/acupuncture-antitrust-suit-goesforward-in-north-carolina (noting that a North Carolina federal judge denied a bid to dismiss a
lawsuit against the North Carolina Acupuncture Licensing Board, dismissing the board’s arguments
that the therapists had not adequately pled a conspiracy or antitrust injury).
61. 157 F. Supp. 3d 130, 132 (D. Conn. 2016).
62. Id. at 142–43.
63. Id. at 143, 147.
64. 793 F.3d 281, 283–84 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016).
65. Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149, 169 (D. Conn. 2014).
66. Martinez, 793 F.3d at 286.
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7. Other Contexts
Some of the farthest reaching consequences of the North Carolina
State Board decision are outside the health care context. For example,
prominent ride-sharing companies are using the ruling to challenge local
restrictions on taxi services. In Wallen v. St. Louis Metropolitan Taxicab
Commission, the plaintiffs sued the St. Louis Metropolitan Taxicab
Commission, alleging the Commission’s efforts to prohibit Uber from
operating in St. Louis violated the Sherman Act.67 After citing several
paragraphs from North Carolina State Board, the district court concluded
that the Commission was not entitled to state action immunity because its
purpose was to regulate and oversee vehicles for hire to ensure public
safety.68 As such, “displacement of competition is not the logical result
of the statutory framework,” and “the state has not clearly articulated a
policy of allowing anticompetitive conduct.”69
Similarly, LegalZoom, a national vendor that sells legal forms directly
to consumers for their independent use, invoked North Carolina State
Board to dispose of long-standing investigations or complaints by state
bar associations. In October 2015, a consent decree was issued in
Legalzoom.com, Inc., v. North Carolina State Bar,70 under which the
State Bar dropped its complaint against LegalZoom for the unauthorized
practice of law, and LegalZoom dropped its antitrust claim against the
State Bar. As a result, LegalZoom was able to register its prepaid legal
service plans in North Carolina and sell its legal forms without further
harassment by the State Bar.
III. RESTORATION, RESTRUCTURING, OR DISRUPTION?
What are the longer-term implications of North Carolina State Board
for the conduct of professional licensing boards and therefore for the
height of regulatory barriers to competition and innovation in health care?
As baseball great Yogi Berra famously noted, “it is difficult to make
predictions—especially about the future.” But in general terms, the
choices are basically: (i) restoring the status quo with assurances of good
behavior; (ii) restructuring state boards to escape the application of the
Supreme Court’s standard; or (iii) truly disrupting how professional selfregulators do business.
Licensing boards think of themselves as gatekeepers and standard
setters, upholding the traditions of their professions and protecting the
67.
68.
69.
70.

No. 4:15-cv-1432 HEA, 2016 WL 5846825, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 6, 2016).
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
No. 11 CVS 15111, 2015 WL 6441853, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2015).
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public from unsafe or unethical individuals. Depending on how the
licensing board is constituted, some (or perhaps many) members will not
have formal constituencies of economic actors to represent, and will
instead seek to pursue the public interest as they see it. Boards do so by
adopting general rules delineating permissible practices, and by
disciplining specific licensees. Some (perhaps many) of these actions can
be justified as the least restrictive means necessary to protect vulnerable
buyers in a market beset by information gaps and asymmetries.
But some (again, perhaps many) board actions will also have overtly
anticompetitive effects, in that they foreclose entire states as available
markets for particular producers or particular products. Many members
of professional licensing boards share biases based on commonalities of
training and experience. Even if many of their decisions do not involve
the egregious self-interest demonstrated in North Carolina State Board,
there is still the risk they will act based on historically conditioned notions
of how “their” profession should be behaving—as well as of the
boundaries that mark their profession’s exclusive domain (i.e., their
“turf”).
Furthermore, anticompetitive self-regulation is often challenging to
disentangle from explicit state law. Health care is both subsidized and
extensively regulated by state legislative and executive enactments that
are fully immune from federal antitrust attack. Many of these laws,
however, assume professional competence and ethics to achieve their
objectives. The cumulative effect of embedding these unsupervised
private processes within this seemingly comprehensive but inadequately
specified regulatory framework is to worsen public policy-making
inertia, and perpetuate conditions that are both anticompetitive and
increasingly inconsistent with democratic preferences for access, quality,
and efficiency.
For these reasons, we believe the North Carolina State Board decision
has the potential to be a “disruptive innovation.” That term, coined by
Harvard business school professor Clayton Christensen, is usually
ascribed to new technologies and business models that fundamentally
alter the competitive terrain.71 Disruptive innovations do not have to
involve dramatic technological improvements or substantial gains in
quality. Indeed, offering a “slimmed-down” product at a much lower
price point can disrupt a business model built on “next year’s technology
at next year’s prices.” North Carolina State Board has this disruptive
71. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A
DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTHCARE (2008) (discussing a roadmap for innovation and reform
for today’s broken health care system).
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potential, because it may help remove long-standing obstacles to
competition based on price, convenience, and reliability in health care.
We doubt that the six Supreme Court justices who made up the
majority in North Carolina State Board had such lofty ambitions for their
technical judgment as to the boundaries of the state action doctrine. Still,
the opinion was surprisingly bold—turning on the substantive risk that
state licensing boards were being co-opted by private market participants
to serve anticompetitive purposes rather than based on formalities of
board composition or procedural integrity. As such, the decision in North
Carolina State Board provides new weaponry against health professions
who use state power to further their self-interest, instead of serving the
public. Certainly, the ruling should give licensing boards throughout the
country significant pause before adopting ad hoc policies that
disadvantage their competitors. More speculatively, the case has the
potential to induce a general conversation (and perhaps uniform or model
legislation) regarding the accountability of professional self-regulatory
bodies to actual state government. Its impact could be comparable to a
major revamping of Joint Commission standards for health care
facilities—low in visibility, but dramatic in operational effect.
A. Initial Regulatory Responses
States can either defend the substantive merits of the decisions made
by their licensing boards ex post, or they can take action ex ante to ensure
the requirements of the state action doctrine are met. Governmental
responses to the North Carolina State Board ruling were swift but hardly
decisive. Within six months of the ruling, FTC staff released a detailed
guidance document regarding both the need for “active supervision” and
the forms it might take.72 The FTC’s analysis considers a range of
situations, including circumstances where active market participants
“control” board actions but lack a majority vote. Regardless of the
specifics, when active market participants are in charge, the FTC believes
“active supervision” is required to review both blanket rules and
individual disciplinary actions.73
Oklahoma and California also issued their own policies regarding the

72. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF STATE REGULATORY BOARDS
CONTROLLED
BY
MARKET
PARTICIPANTS
(Oct.
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policyguidance/active_supervision_of_state_boards.pdf [hereinafter FTC GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE
SUPERVISION].
73. Absent a pattern of selective enforcement, individual disciplinary actions are much less
likely to be anticompetitive. Id.
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North Carolina State Board decision. These pronouncements generally
took the ruling seriously, discouraging licensing boards from intruding
on competitive matters, and proposing new mechanisms for substantive
review by formal state actors.
In Oklahoma, the governor issued an Executive Order requiring boards
controlled by a majority of active market participants to submit all
proposed licensure and prohibition actions, including major disciplinary
actions, to the state attorney general for review.74 Failure to comply with
the attorney general’s recommendation would result in dismissal for
misconduct. A month later, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued
guidance elaborating on the Executive Order.75 Notably, the Executive
Order does not apply to actions taken through formal rule making—
where a state licensing board might also engage in anticompetitive
conduct with far more extensive adverse consequences than would result
from a single disciplinary action.
In California, the attorney general issued its own opinion on North
Carolina State Board.76 As in Oklahoma, the California Attorney
General carved out rule making from actions requiring independent
active supervision. But the California Attorney General opined that
disciplinary actions did not require additional review because of existing
procedural safeguards. It also argued that many actions of state boards
are not “market-sensitive” and, in many instances, are procompetitive.
Despite these caveats, the opinion points out that states can take various
actions to comply with the holding in North Carolina State Board. The
tactics include: (i) adopting legislation to change the composition of
boards (which the attorney general did not favor); (ii) establishing a
stand-alone office or one that is part of a larger agency such as the
Department of Consumer Affairs to review board actions; (iii) modifying
board powers to be advisory, with formal action reserved for a
supervising agency; (iv) enacting laws expressly conferring antitrust
immunity on boards, to the extent those laws would be upheld by the
federal courts; and (v) providing indemnification for board members to
ensure their continued willingness to serve. It remains to be seen whether
California will take any of these steps given the permissive tone of the
74. Exec.
Order
No.
2015-33
(July
17,
2015),
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/993.pdf.
75. Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Att’y Gen., to All Bds. & Comm’ns with Active Mkt. Participant
Majorities
(Aug.
17,
2015),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/content.newsok.com/documents/FINAL%20Letter%20to%20Agencies
%2008212015.pdf.
76. Office of the Att’y Gen., State of Cal., Formal Opinion No. 15-402, 98 Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen.
12 (Sept. 10, 2015), https://media.nasba.org/files/2015/12/Dental-Case-CA-AG.pdf.
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attorney general’s opinion.
In North Carolina itself, legislation was introduced that would require
the state to actively supervise certain activities of the State Bar,
“including the State Bar’s actions taken against perceived competitors it
claims are engaged in the ‘unauthorized practice of law.’” 77 The bill
would impose a requirement that before the State Bar can issue a demand
to cease and desist the unauthorized practice of law, the “Attorney
General shall review the substance and procedure of any decision . . . to
ensure that the proposed action is consistent with State policy.” 78 To
date, the bill has not progressed beyond referral to the Senate Rules
Committee.
B. Restoring the Status Quo
Some states may try to do as little as possible in response to North
Carolina State Board. One strategy is to “lawyer” the Supreme Court’s
opinion into submission, by using every procedural and substantive
argument to counter private lawsuits brought against state boards. This
strategy will also involve strategically settling some disputes, to preserve
the essence of self-regulatory authority even as specific decisions made
under that authority are bargained away.
This seems to be how the TMB is currently defending its position in
the Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board litigation. Facing substantial
opposition in its appeal to the Fifth Circuit of an adverse district court
ruling on state action immunity, the State of Texas withdrew its petition,
but pledged to defend its position on all other legal grounds.
Tactics of this sort allow antitrust litigation against state licensing
boards to continue, but attempt to make the local legal environment
inhospitable—especially to lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs rather
than the federal enforcement agencies. As long as funding is available
for an aggressive defense, and those serving on boards have assurances
of indemnification, there are many novel, significant issues that courts
will have to resolve before awarding victories to plaintiffs. For example,
what standards for Sherman Act liability should courts apply to particular
board actions? Which actions can be condemned after only a “quick
look” rather than a full “rule of reason” inquiry? Do the same standards
apply to actions that harm competition within the licensed profession
77. Complaint ¶ 3, LegalZoom.Com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 1:15-CV-439, 2015 WL
34998877 (M.D.N.C. June 3, 2015) (citing S.B. 353, 2015 N.C. Sess. (Mar. 19, 2015)).
78. S.B. 353, 2015 N.C. Sess. (Mar. 19, 2015). See also Senate Bill 353, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2015&BillID=S353&
votesToView=all (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (noting that the bill was referred to the Committee on
Rules and Operations of the Senate on March 23, 2015 and subsequently died in committee).

11_SAGE (723-55).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

748

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

5/30/2017 12:01 PM

[Vol. 48

versus actions that protect the licensed profession from external
competition? What about actions that diminish competition in some
ancillary activity but do not favor the economic interests of the
profession? How does a plaintiff prove “antitrust injury”? Are individual
disciplinary actions subject to review, absent evidence that they are part
of a pattern to exclude certain classes of practitioners or types of practice?
Which procompetitive benefits may be considered? How (if at all) should
we measure the benefit of public confidence in the quality of licensed
professionals, even if prices are higher and access (output) is lower
because of licensure? To what degree do state sovereign immunity (as
distinct from antitrust immunity) and the Eleventh Amendment constrain
private actions seeking damages?79
A related approach will be to attempt to obtain state legislative
ratification of existing professional settlements while sidestepping the
deeper competitive issues raised by North Carolina State Board. For
example, as noted previously, the TMB cut a legislative deal during the
pendency of the Teladoc litigation with the local telehealth industry,
which would rewrite the challenged language of Rule 190.8 without
wholly undercutting the board’s authority. Quick compromises of this
sort may resolve the narrow issues in dispute, but they offer little
assurance that barriers to competition will be lowered more generally. To
the contrary, they potentially worsen anticompetitive harm by enabling
existing stakeholders to buy off well-funded challengers while
simultaneously using legislation to place the traditional self-regulatory
architecture beyond the reach of antitrust law.
State legislatures may attempt to confer state action immunity on their
existing professional boards by enacting blanket authorizations to depart
from competitive norms—using COPAs as a template. These legislative
pronouncements may or may not withstand review in federal court, but
they send a signal to potential litigants that the full political power of the
state will resist any challenge.
A final possibility, though one that is unlikely to improve competition
in health care, is congressional intervention. The Supreme Court majority
in North Carolina State Board did not seem concerned that its decision
would trigger massive departures from licensing boards by professionals
79. While the FTC and the Department of Justice may sue states in federal court to enforce
federal law, private parties may not. As a practical matter, then, private injunctive relief may
depend on suing individual board members under Ex parte Young, and damage remedies may be
unavailable even for egregiously anticompetitive conduct. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–
56 (1908) (recognizing an exception to sovereign immunity in lawsuits against state officials of
both state agencies and boards for declaratory or injunctive relief to stop ongoing violations of
federal law).
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concerned about their potential personal liability. But Congress might
not feel equally reassured if pressured by the list of professional
associations that filed amicus briefs in support of North Carolina. An
analogous issue was central to an earlier case, Patrick v. Burget, in which
the federal courts rejected a state action defense and upheld a multimillion dollar damage award to an Oregon surgeon who was denied
hospital privileges by a credentialing committee controlled by his
competitors (and former partners).80 After the lower court decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1988, there was widespread concern
that physicians would refuse to participate in hospital-level peer review,
which would result in the immediate collapse of the credentialing and
privileges process.
Congress responded by enacting the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act (“HCQIA”), which conferred antitrust immunity on physicians
making bona fide staff privileges decisions as long as certain procedural
requirements were satisfied.81 Congress essentially applied a “good faith
plus due process” standard. A similar response to North Carolina State
Board might be politically expedient, but it would almost certainly return
licensing boards to “business as usual”—perpetuating many barriers to
competitive entry and innovation as long as boards adequately document
the basis for their decisions.
C. Restructuring Self-Regulatory Boards
In North Carolina State Board, the Supreme Court’s standard for
triggering the active supervision requirement is whether a licensing board
is “controlled” by “active market participants.”82 A straightforward
adaptation to avoid liability is to restructure boards so that either control
or market participation is reduced.
In its guidance document, FTC staff anticipated that states might be
inclined to evade the requirement for active supervision with cosmetic
changes that did not alter the underlying realities. Accordingly, FTC staff
took a very expansive view of both market participation and of control.
The guidance defines an “active market participant” as anyone who has
a license issued by the board (including any license temporarily
suspended or surrendered for the purpose of board service), or whose
work is regulated by the board (whether or not the board member

80. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988).
81. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, title IV, §401 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2016)).
82. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015).
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performs the specific tasks associated with a challenged regulation).83
Echoing the Supreme Court’s opinion, FTC staff deemed the method of
selecting board members irrelevant to “market participant” status.84
North Carolina’s dental board was unusual in that dentist members
were elected by the state’s dental practitioners, supporting an inference
that they served their constituents’ interests rather than the public interest.
This fact could potentially limit the national impact of a high court ruling
against it. At oral argument, however, when the FTC’s lawyer cautiously
began his presentation by focusing attention on board elections in North
Carolina, Justice Elena Kagan immediately interrupted and expressed
incredulity at his desire to base his case on such a small point.85
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court’s decision was not so limited.
With respect to control, capping active market participants at less than
half the voting members would seem the simplest ex ante solution to
North Carolina State Board. Although states can use this approach to
comply with the letter of the law while evading its spirit (e.g., by
appointing retired professionals or populating the remaining seats with
individuals unlikely to challenge the judgments of the professionals on
the board), this would still be a positive development given recent
increases in the number of licensed professions—each with its own
board. FTC staff also views “control” very expansively, and indicated it
would consider a tradition of deference to professionals, their ability to
take certain board actions without a majority, or even the necessity of
obtaining the vote of one or more professionals to obtain a majority (i.e.,
veto power) as de facto “control” requiring active supervision.
Although the FTC staff did not highlight the point, it is important to
acknowledge that the current structure of state licensure, which depends
on self-regulatory boundaries dividing professions, itself has
anticompetitive consequences. National organizations representing state
boards of medicine, nursing, and pharmacy have recognized the
dysfunctions that result from this siloed approach, and therefore created
a Tri-Regulator Collaborative to share information and ultimately remake
many licensing and disciplinary functions using an interprofessional
model.86 It is interesting to consider how a court hearing an antitrust suit
83. FTC GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION, supra note 72, at 7.
84. Id.
85. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No.
13-534), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-534_8nj9.pdf.
86. HUMAYUN J. CHAUDHRY ET AL., TRI-REGULATOR COLLABORATIVE POSITION
STATEMENT
ON
INTERPROFESSIONAL,
TEAM-BASED
PATIENT
CARE
(2014),
https://www.ncsbn.org/Team-Based_Care.pdf (describing the joint publication of the Federation of
State Medical Boards, National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, and National Council of State
Boards of Nursing).
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might deal with a licensing board based on an interprofessional model
where no single group constituted a majority, with or without substantial
membership from consumers and other laypeople. Should the court
presume that the licensed professionals on the board will engage in logrolling, thereby maintaining the status quo, or does the presence of
multiple professionals cut against that assessment?
Alternatively, a state could create an umbrella board with oversight
responsibility for the decisions of individual professional boards. The
umbrella board would both insulate the subsidiary boards from suit and
avoid the overtly parochial self-interest that might otherwise prevail in a
subsidiary board.
D. Putting Meaningful Active Supervision in Place
There are many paths a state can follow in satisfying the requirement
for active supervision. In North Carolina State Board, the Supreme
Court stated only that the state supervising authority “must review the
substance of the anticompetitive decision[;] . . . must have the power to
veto or modify particular decisions to ensure they accord with state
policy; and . . . may not itself be an active market participant.”87 The
lodestar for the Court is political accountability at the state level. Open
questions include the locus and timing of review and approval, the degree
of responsiveness to public complaints or comments, the basis and record
for decisions, and the degree to which board actions may be aggregated
and periodically reviewed and approved in groups.
1. National Coordination
States may be tempted to craft idiosyncratic approaches to supervising
health professional boards based on their constitutional frameworks,
political preferences, governance traditions, and administrative
procedure acts. It is likely that such solutions will prove harder than
expected to develop and implement—in part because most medical
boards are treated with great deference (and, as a result, usually protect
their licensees more effectively than they protect the public), and in part
because too much variation may prove problematic for national
organizations, such as the Federation of State Medical Boards (“FSMB”)
and the American Medical Association.
For these reasons, coordinated approaches to active supervision seem
desirable. Because the aggregate national investment in health care is so
great, and because most of those funds are redistributed from state to state
through either public or private insurance, there are many groups and
87. N.C. State Bd. Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116–17 (internal citations omitted).
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organizations available to develop national “best practices” for active
supervision or a uniform state law. Possible convening organizations
include the FSMB, the National Academy for State Health Policy, the
National Governors Association, the Administrative Conference of the
United States, and the National Association of State Attorneys General.
It is also conceivable, though less likely, that congressional intervention
might result in legislation containing federal “safe harbors” for modes of
state supervision that further competition rather than merely reinforce the
status quo.
2. Judicial Review
Judicial review is problematic as active supervision, although the
Supreme Court has not definitively stated that it is insufficient. Judicial
review is almost always reactive rather than routine; tends to focus on
procedural aspects of administrative decisions; and even when oriented
toward substance applies deferential standards based on rationality or
nonarbitrariness. Obviously that would not invalidate the majority of
licensing board actions—no matter how self-interested they actually are.
Courts would also struggle to evaluate the evidentiary basis for
decisions. Unlike most administrative agencies, medical boards are
expert, but not fully accountable, decision makers. Physicians serving on
medical boards tend to be regarded as independent authorities on
appropriate practice rather than as skilled analysts of objective scientific
evidence. As a result, the deference that courts typically owe to an agency
under state administrative law is compounded by the traditional deference
given to physicians.
3. Legislative Review
Routine legislative review would be difficult in most, if not all, states.
The purpose of administrative delegation is to facilitate expert, timely
resolution of issues that are either not sufficiently important or are too
politically contentious for a state legislature to decide itself. Periodic
legislative ratification might prove inadequate as active supervision
because it is untimely and likely to be superficial.
One advantage of state legislative review is that it would subject a
much larger percentage of anticompetitive regulation affecting health
care to bona fide political accountability – which after all is the core
purpose of the active supervision requirement. But if legislators continue
historical patterns of hyperdeference to physician experience as
communicated through licensing boards, the result will be merely the
“gauzy cloak of state involvement” criticized by the Supreme Court in
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California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.88 That
shouldn’t fly in the federal courts—and it won’t.
4. Administrative or Attorney General Oversight
As our discussion of Oklahoma suggests, in many instances
supervision can be performed by an administrative office of state
government. The underlying concept of that approach is to transition
health professional boards (e.g., medicine, nursing, pharmacy, etc.) from
a “statutory self-regulation” model to a “supervised self-regulation”
model.89 The former model is based on a general legislative delegation
of authority, while the latter places each board under the direct control of
a named state agency such as a department of health, a consumer
protection bureau, or the state attorney general’s office.
The regulatory supervisor would subject each board’s actions to
structured review and approval on a routine basis, and often would be
able to coordinate activities and mediate disputes among boards.
Depending on the board and the action it is taking, each board’s initial
degree of autonomy could vary. Actions with substantial risk of
anticompetitive consequences might be subjected to an FDA Advisory
Committee approach, in which the agency, and not the board, issues the
operative decisions. Actions with less risk might more resemble the
relationship among the Joint Commission, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, and state Medicaid agencies determining which
hospitals may serve Medicare and Medicaid patients.
FTC staff guidance contemplates executive agency review of this sort,
including independently gathering information from the public; weighing
the substance of the board’s proposed action; and issuing a written
opinion accepting, modifying, or rejecting it.90 Although this represents
the FTC staff’s wish list and not the state of the law, facts will matter
greatly in resolving disputes that arise under North Carolina State Board.
Evidence regarding the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and
persuasiveness of challenged decisions therefore is likely to be a recurrent
need. Administrative standards will depart from the subjective,
experiential fashion in which state licensing boards have historically
operated—sometimes overturning hearing officers who had assembled
88. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980).
89. Margot Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation, 29 OTTAWA L.
REV. 233, 239–44 (1997–1998) (classifying self-regulatory models).

90. FTC GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION, supra note 72; see also Debbie Feinstein &
Geoffrey Green, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The When and What of Active
Supervision, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 14, 2015, 12:28 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/competition-matters/2015/10/when-what-active-supervision.
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impressive amounts of more objective evidence supporting contrary
conclusions. A beneficial consequence of exposing licensing board
actions to antitrust scrutiny is that evidence refuting competitive harm or
demonstrating offsetting competitive benefits should become more
rigorous.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to health care, the government wears multiple hats—
and often behaves as if it has multiple personalities. As a payor, the
government prioritizes access to care for its beneficiaries at a predictable
cost to itself. As a regulator, the government prioritizes a minimum level
of quality, enforced through restrictions on entry and occasional
sanctioning of outliers. When exercising these politically controversial
functions, the government very often defers to and empowers the medical
profession to set standards for patient care, professional independence,
and insurance coverage. As competition advocate and antitrust enforcer,
however, the government prioritizes active markets with fluid entry,
continuous innovation, and consumer sovereignty—goals that are
supposedly agnostic to the products sold and the sellers thereof. When
all three perspectives must be considered—let alone harmonized—the
degree of difficulty becomes immense.
As a doctrinal matter, professions have been subject to the antitrust
laws for the last forty years. Nonetheless, market competition has been
unable to secure for health care consumers the benefits of fairly priced,
readily accessible, reliable, and innovative products that are common in
other industries. In our view, the explanation is that competition policy
in health care is one part antitrust enforcement, but several parts
regulation and several parts subsidy. Antitrust enforcers have largely
failed to navigate the narrow channel between the Scylla of ignoring the
government’s responsibilities as a payor and regulator, and the Charybdis
of acquiescing to overtly anticompetitive behavior as long as it is covered
by a gossamer-thin assertion of state action.
North Carolina State Board has the potential to catalyze the health care
system’s transition to a new regulatory-competitive equilibrium that is
less wasteful of resources and more hospitable to new entry and
innovation. It remains to be seen if the decision will have a small or large
effect on competition in health care. The best case scenario is that active
supervision will serve as a partial “reset” button for competition in health
care, reducing costs of production and enabling new methods of service
delivery that improve value for consumers. The worst case scenario is
that nothing much will change, apart from some “papering of the file” to
satisfy the active supervision requirement.
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Physician control of the health care marketplace is enshrined in explicit
law and in the long traditions of professional self-regulation. As a result,
North Carolina State Board may or may not signal a sea change in the
structure and performance of the health care system. But, at the very
least, the Supreme Court’s requirement of active supervision demands
that when state medical boards are called to account for anticompetitive
decisions, their defense must consist of “something more than ‘we’re
doctors, trust us.’”91

91. William M. Sage, Competitive Harm from State Licensing Boards: First North Carolina
Dentists,
Now
Texas
Physicians?,
HEALTH
AFF.
(May
27
2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/27/competitive-harm-from-state-licensing-boards-firstnorth-carolina-dentists-now-texas-physicians/ (quoting the federal district judge hearing the
Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board antitrust case against the TMB’s attempt to limit telephonic
physician prescribing).

